Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for
  connected/automated driving by Lin, DianChao et al.
Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy
for connected/automated driving
Dianchao Lina, Li Lia, Saif Eddin Jabaria,b,∗
aTandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, New York, U.S.A.
bDivision of Engineering, New York University Abu Dhabi, Saadiyat Island, P.O. Box 129188,
Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.
Abstract
This paper proposes a cooperative lane changing strategy using a trans-
ferable utility games framework. This allows vehicles to engage in transac-
tions where gaps in traffic are created in exchange for monetary compen-
sation. The proposed approach is best suited to discretionary lane change
maneuvers. We formulate gains in travel time, referred to as time differ-
ences, that result from achieving higher speeds. These time differences,
coupled with value of time, are used to formulate a utility function, where
utility is transferable. We also allow for games between connected vehi-
cles that do not involve transfer of utility. We apply Nash bargaining the-
ory to solve the latter. A cellular automaton is developed and utilized to
perform simulation experiments that explore the impact of such transac-
tions on traffic conditions (travel-time savings, resulting speed-density re-
lations and shock wave formation) and the benefit to vehicles. The results
show that lane changing with transferable utility between drivers can help
achieve win-win results, improve both individual and social benefits with-
out resulting in any adverse effects on traffic characteristics in general and,
in fact, result in slight improvement at traffic densities outside of free-flow
and (bumper-to-bumper) jammed traffic.
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, lane changing, connected vehicles,
transferable utility, side payment, mobile payment
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1. Introduction
Lane-changing is one of the fundamental maneuvers in vehicular traffic
dynamics. Vehicles change lanes to achieve desired speeds (discretionary
lane-changing), to avoid unsafe conditions or to move into turning/exit
lanes (mandatory lane changing). A majority of models of both types of
lane change maneuvers describe them as discrete decision processes car-
ried out by vehicles that are considering/attempting to change lanes (Gipps,
1986; Kesting et al., 2007; Zheng, 2014; Kamal et al., 2015; Du et al., 2015;
Keyvan-Ekbatani et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016a; Pan et al., 2016; Bevly et al.,
2016). We refer to (Ahmed et al., 1996; Toledo et al., 2003) for a classical
reference on discrete choice methods for lane changing and to (Pan et al.,
2016) for a more recent background on these types of lane changing models.
These tend to ignore the competition for space that may arise between ve-
hicles and how this competition affects their decisions. This has given rise
to game theoretic techniques in modeling lane-changing dynamics (Kita,
1999; Kita et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2015; Meng et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2007;
Talebpour et al., 2015; Oyler et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). A typical setting
in these approaches is one in which a discrete set of maneuvers (typically
two or three) are being considered by a vehicle that is attempting to change
lanes (the target vehicle) and a vehicle that is in the target lane but behind
the target vehicle (the lag vehicle). For example, the target vehicle may have
the choice set {change lane, do not change lane} while the lag vehicle has
the choice set {give way, do not give way} (Rahman et al., 2013).
The different approaches in the literature vary in how they model the
payoffs associated with pure strategies, which may vary depending on
whether the maneuver is mandatory or discretionary. Some papers only
consider lane changing games for mandatory behavior, such as merging
(Kita, 1993, 1999; Pei and Xu, 2006). Most game-theoretic approaches con-
sider lane changing to be non-cooperative games, the outcomes of which
are either Nash or Stackelberg equilibria depending on how the game is
modeled (Yoo and Langari, 2013; Li et al., 2016b; Yu et al., 2018). Cooper-
ative strategies have also been considered recently (Wang et al., 2015; Yao
et al., 2017; Zimmermann et al., 2018). A common feature of the latter is
that vehicles are assumed to be selfless; one in which cooperative vehicles
(typically under some form of control) will take actions that maximize the
collective or group utility, not their own. This leads to winners and losers.
Automation and vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication present an
opportunity to re-think lane-changing strategies. These allow vehicles to
broadcast their payoffs, which can vary from vehicle to vehicle and for
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the same vehicle from trip to trip, i.e., depending on trip purpose (Hos-
san et al., 2016). Communication also allows vehicles to engage in bargain-
ing (and/or repeated) games. These two features culminate in a depar-
ture from the traditional (non-cooperative) game-theoretic lane-changing
approaches in which decisions are made without communication1. Indeed,
with vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication capabilities, connected ve-
hicles can easily engage in transactions based on their individual travel
needs. For example, quick mobile payment without transaction costs has
gained popularity in China.
In light of this, we propose a discretionary lane changing paradigm,
suitable for an automated world, in which gaps in traffic are envisaged
as resources (or goods) that can be traded. In simple terms, we propose
a lane changing mechanism that allows vehicles to purchase right of way
or compensate other vehicles for allowing them to change lanes. From a
modeling stand-point, we propose modeling lane changing as transferable
utility (TU) games with side payments (Thomas, 2008; Myerson, 2013). Our
approach also allows for vehicles to refuse to engage in TU games as well;
in this case, we consider Nash bargaining. It can be shown (when there
are no transaction fees) that the outcomes of these games are at least pareto
efficient (Coase, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
TU games are applied to lane changing dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 describes the problem set-
ting and formulates the utility functions and the game’s payoffs in Sec. 2.1
- Sec. 2.3. The remainder of Sec. 2 presents the lane change games with,
transfer of utility, side payments (Sec. 2.4), and games between connected
vehicles that do not wish to engage in transactions, i.e., games with non-
transferable utility (Sec. 2.5). Sec. 3 presents a numerical example and a
set of simulation experiments to test the proposed model, analyze the re-
sults from the aspects of cost-effectiveness and impact on traffic flow. Sec. 4
concludes the paper.
2. Methodology
2.1. Problem description
We consider discretionary lane change maneuvers. The game setting
we assume is one that is played between pairs of vehicles, a lane changing
1Although it is common to assume that the vehicles are perfectly knowledgeable (of the
payoffs).
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(target) vehicle and a lag vehicle in the target lane. We shall focus on this
simple setting, but the ideas are generalizable to games involving more
than two vehicles or settings involving two lane changing vehicles. For
example, the proposed approach can be easily extended to situations with
multiple pairwise lane change games: one simply parallelizes the proposed
approach. A more general framework is one where a vehicle engaged in
transactions with more than one vehicle simultaneously, e.g., a vehicle that
wishes to make two immediate lane change maneuvers. The first maneuver
can be analyzed in a similar way to the pairwise approach described in this
paper. Pricing the second maneuver is more subtle as it depends on the
outcome of the first maneuver. However, the proposed approach can still
be utilized as a building block for such sophisticated scenarios.
It is assumed that vehicles involved in the game can communicate posi-
tions, speeds, accelerations, and values of time (VOTs). This paper assumes
that vehicles communicate these variables truthfully and leave the interest-
ing question of untruthfulness to future research. We assume mixed traffic:
vehicles capable of (and willing to) engage in lane change transactions, re-
ferred to as transaction vehicles (TV), and those that either do not possess
transaction capabilities (or do not wish to engage in transactions), which
are referred to as non-transaction vehicles (NTV); see Fig. 1. We assume that
vehicles equipped with communication capabilities are free to choose be-
tween being TVs or NTVs. We also assume some level of automation in the
TVs allowing for minimal input from drivers over the course of a trip, in
which multiple such lane change decisions (transactions) may take place.
Fig. 1: Transaction vehicles (TVs) and non-transaction vehicles (NTVs).
The types of games considered in this paper are those in which utility
can be transfered (or traded) between vehicles. While the motivations for
changing lanes can include numerous factors, such as comfort, safety, and
speed, not all of these factors can be traded. For example, safety cannot
(and should not) be traded. Utility can only be transfered when a common
currency that is valued equally by both vehicles is used. It is for this reason
that we formulate the utility function below using VOT. The mathematical
notation used in this paper is listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Notation
Variable Description
vi1 the higher speed choice (of vehicle i)
vi2 the lower speed choice (of vehicle i)
viE the expected equilibrium speed (of vehicle i)
vi the speed choice of vehicle i
ai1 the acceleration from v1 to vE (of vehicle i)
ai2 the acceleration from v2 to vE (of vehicle i)
apos the value of a1 and a2 we used in simulation when they are positive
aneg the value of a1 and a2 we used in simulation when they are negative
ta the average time it takes for a vehicle to complete a lane-change
tb1 the time when the speed of vehicle changes from v1 to vE
tb2 the time when the speed of vehicle changes from v2 to vE
tb max{tb1, tb2}
Sa the difference in distance achieved when choosing v1 over v2 from
time 0 to ta
Sb the difference in distance achieved when choosing v1 over v2 from
time ta to tb
S the difference in distance achieved when choosing v1 over v2 from
time 0 to tb, S = Sa + Sb
tid the time difference between achieving v1 and v2 (for vehicle i)
civot the coefficient representing the VOT (of vehicle i)
ui the utility of vehicle i
A, B the utility matrices of vehicles A and B, respectively
p the probability for vehicle A to change lanes in its threat strategy in a
TU game
q the probability for vehicle B to not give way in its threat strategy in a
TU game
TA, TB the payoffs of vehicles A and B, respectively, at their threat strategies
QA,QB the payoffs of vehicles A and B, respectively, at status quo
ω∗ the total maximal achievable utility by vehicles A and B in a TU game
(i∗, j∗) the strategy pair that achieves the maximal payoff ω∗, also the final
decision of TU game
σ the side payment in a TU game
NA, NB the payoff of vehicle A and B at the Nash bargaining solution in an
NTU game
(i′, j′) the final decision of NTU game
psd the probability for vehicle to slow down in the simulation
vmax the maximum speed of vehicle in the simulation
β the benefit index of vehicles
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2.2. Utility function
Consider two vehicles, A and B, in the lane-changing game depicted in
Fig. 2. Vehicle A has the choice set: {change lanes, do not change lanes}
and vehicle B’s choice set is {give way, do not give way}. The payoffs are
Fig. 2: Lane change scenarios between two TVs.
summarized in Table 2; Aij and Bij are the payoffs to vehicles A and B,
respectively, associated with actions i and j. If A chooses to change lanes
Table 2: Utility matrix for lane changing game
Actions
vehicle B
Do not give way Give way
vehicle A
Change lanes (A11,B11) (A12,B12)
Do not change lanes (A21,B21) (A22,B22)
and B chooses not to give way, we assume that both vehicles get a large
negative payoff (e.g., they collide). If A changes lanes and B gives way, we
denote the speeds achieved by vehicles A and B by vA1 and v
B
2 , respectively.
If A stays as a result of B not giving way, we denote the speeds achieved
by A and B by vA2 and v
B
1 , respectively. Here, we have that v
A
1 > v
A
2 and
vB1 > v
B
2 . When A chooses to stay despite B giving way, they both assume
the lower speeds vA2 and v
B
2 .
For vehicle A, the utility function, denoted uA (uB for B) is related to
both its own speed choice vA, and that of vehicle B denoted vB. Similarly,
uB is related to both vB and vA. Vehicle A’s utility function is given by
uA(vA, vB) =

−M vA = vA1 , vB = vB1
cAvottAd v
A = vA1 , v
B = vB2
0 vA = vA2
, (1)
where M is a large positive number, cAvot is a coefficient capturing VOT of
A, and tAd is referred to as time difference between choosing lower speed v
A
2
and higher speed vA1 for A. Using time difference as a means of calculat-
ing the utility, the reference point (a.k.a. datum) of uA coincides with the
action vA = vA2 ; that is u
A(vA2 , ·) = 0. The latter can be interpreted as:
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choosing/maintaining the lower speed comes with zero utility. Vehicle B’s
utility, uB, can be calculated in a similar fashion. The resulting payoff matri-
ces, denoted A and B for players A and B, respectively are given as follows
A ≡
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
=
[−M cAvottAd
0 0
]
and B ≡
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
=
[ −M 0
cBvottBd 0
]
.
(2)
Time difference is the travel time saved with the higher-speed choice over
a short time period. How it is calculated is described in Sec. 2.3 below. As a
result of td being defined as time gained when compared to the lower speed
scenario, the pay-off pair (A22, B22) = (0, 0). This is elaborated further be-
low. It is plausible that the case where B gives way, but A does not change
lanes results in vehicle B being annoyed, in which case B22 would be nega-
tive. However, we have no way to quantify this loss in utility due to being
annoyed and thus ignore it in this paper.
2.3. Modeling of time difference
Assume a vehicle is traveling with longitudinal speed v = v0 and at
time t = 0 an opportunity presents itself for the vehicle to achieve a higher
speed (e.g., via a lane change). We make no assumptions about lane prefer-
ence in this paper. That is, vehicles can use any lane to pass. Consequently,
it is reasonable to assume that the two lanes have similar traffic conditions
(on average); that is, the (macroscopic) traffic densities are the same and,
hence, that the equilibrium speeds do not depend on lane. However, the
equilibrium speeds can vary by vehicle depending on their VOT (in ad-
dition to traffic density). We do not assume that the gaps in traffic are the
same and this is what creates the speed gain opportunities. The speed gains
occur over a short period of time equal to the length of an equilibration pro-
cess. For example, a vehicle changing lanes accelerates to a higher speed
then decelerates to the equilibrium speed. Similarly, a vehicle giving way
might decelerate for a short period of time and then accelerate to the equi-
librium speed.
Both the target vehicle (vehicle A) and the lag vehicle (vehicle B) can be
described as vehicles that are changing their speeds to one of two possible
speeds: either v = v1, or v = v2, where v1 > v2. We denote by ta > 0
the time instant at which the vehicle achieves its new speed. We assume,
without loss of generality, that ta is the same in both scenarios. If the higher
speed is adopted, illustrated in the top part of Fig. 3(a), the vehicle reaches
the faster speed v1 over a longer travel distance. If the slower speed is cho-
sen, illustrated in the bottom part of Fig. 3(a), it reaches v2 over a shorter
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travel distance. Note that v0 = v2 is allowed but not necessary as depicted
in Fig. 4(a). Assume these two scenarios are identical in all other aspects
(including traffic conditions, vehicle performance and characteristics, etc.)
so that in both scenarios the vehicle achieves the equilibrium speed even-
tually. We denote the equilibrium speed by vE. The equilibrium speed vE
is mainly dependent on traffic density. Assume, without loss of general-
ity, that v1 ≥ vE ≥ v2. Let tb denote the time instant at which the vehicle
achieves the equilibrium speed vE, tb1 in the first scenario and tb2 in the
second scenario. If the vehicle chooses the higher speed, it will have cov-
ered a longer distance by time tb = max{tb1, tb2} as shown in Fig. 3(b). We
denote the difference in distance covered during the equilibration process
by S. If denote the trajectory of the vehicle by v(·), which in the high speed
(a) t from 0 to ta (b) t from ta to tb
Fig. 3: Influence of different speed choices at time t = 0.
scenario is denoted by vhigh(·) and by vlow(·) in the lower speed scenario.
Then S is defined as
S ≡
∫ tb
0
∣∣v(t)− vlow(t)∣∣dt (3)
with v(tb) = vE. If v(·) = vlow(·), corresponding to the case where vehicle
A does not change lanes or when vehicle B gives way, we have that S = 0.
Since td ∝ S (defined formally below) and uA(vA2 , ·) ∝ td (also, uB(·, vB2 ) ∝
td), we have that A21 = A22 = 0 and B12 = B22 = 0 as given in (2).
In the case where v(·) = vhigh(·), S is the gain in distance under the
higher speed. In this case, under our two speed assumption, (3) can be
calculated using simple geometry. Fig. 4 provides two example trajectory
differences, one for vehicle A, Fig. 4(a), and one for vehicle B, Fig. 4(b). In
both figures, the solid red curve is the vehicle’s trajectory in the high-speed
scenario, the solid blue curve is their trajectory in the low-speed scenario,
and the green line is equilibrium speed.
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(a) Example trajectories for A (b) Example trajectories for B
Fig. 4: Illustration of Sa, Sb1 and Sb2.
To calculate S, we proceed as follows: we first split S into two parts, Sa
and Sb, such that S = Sa+ Sb. Here, Sa denotes the distance difference from
time 0 to time ta; Sb is the difference in distance covered from time ta to time
tb, which we divide into two parts Sb1 and Sb2, such that Sb = Sb1 + Sb2. In
Fig. 4(a), vehicle A finds a gap in the adjacent lane at time t = 0. Their speed
at time zero, v0, is assumed to be equal to vE in the example. If A changes
lanes, they temporarily achieve the higher speed of v1. If v1 > vE, they then
decelerate to vE. If A does not change lanes, they maintain the lower speed
of v2 = vE. We again note that, in general, v0 need not be the equilibrium
speed, which would correspond to the case where an equilibration process
is interrupted by a lane change maneuver. When v2 = vE as in Fig. 4(a),
Sb2 = 0. In Fig. 4(b), vehicle B receives a lane-change request from vehicle
A. If B gives way, they decelerates to v2 and then accelerates to vE. If B does
not give way, they may temporarily accelerate to v1 > vE to close the gap,
but must then decelerate to vE.
From Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), we have that Sa is given by
Sa =
(v1 − v2)ta
2
. (4)
Note that this encompasses the case where vehicle A’s speed at time t = 0
is not the equilibrium speed: v0 6= vE. Similarly, it encompasses the case
where vehicle B does not decelerate. For Sb, the times tb1 and tb2 are gener-
ally not known, but it is safe to assume a constant acceleration/deceleration
rate that falls in appropriate ranges. Let a > 0 denote this acceleration rate,
then
Sb1 =
(vE − v1)2
−2a , (5)
where the negative sign is added to the denominator since Sb1 describes a
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deceleration scenario and
Sb2 =
(vE − v2)2
2a
. (6)
Combining (4), (5), and (6), i.e., S = Sa + Sb1 + Sb2, we get:
S =
1
2
[
(v1 − v2)ta + (vE − v1)
2
−a +
(vE − v2)2
a
]
. (7)
It is worth noting that although (7) was derived under the assumption
that v1 ≥ vE ≥ v2, it also applies to other scenarios, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ vE and
vE ≥ v1 ≥ v2. Moreover, the case v1 = v2 = the lower speed corresponds
to the case where vehicle A does not change lanes (or vehicle B gives way).
Note that, in this case, it follows from (7) that S = 0.
Finally, we define the time difference td as the average amount of travel
time saved during the equilibration process as a result of achieving the
higher speed v1 at time t = 0. That is:
td ≡ SvE =
1
2vE
[
(v1 − v2)ta + (vE − v1)
2
−a +
(vE − v2)2
a
]
, (8)
where the parameters ta, and a need to be calibrated. The speeds v1, v2 and
vE are variables in different TU games, where vE depends on traffic density
in this paper. Note that for a road with heterogeneous traffic conditions
across lanes, one can generalize the proposed approach to one with differ-
ent equilibrium speeds in the two lanes and the areas depicted in Fig. 4
would have more components. We leave this to future research.
2.4. Transfer of utility and side payments
In a game with transferable utility (TU), side payments from one vehi-
cle to another are allowed. These are games that involve two (connected)
vehicles that wish to engage in a transaction. This section describes utility
transfer and how to calculate the side payment. Let σ ∈ R denote the side
payment made by vehicle A to vehicle B. When σ is negative, this is inter-
preted as a positive payment that is made by vehicle B to vehicle A. When
σ < 0, B does not give way to A, but also makes a payment to A as a result.
This is an important factor distinguishing games where vehicles agree to
engage in transactions from those where a transaction does not take place
(the non-transaction games described in the next section).
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The main idea behind transfer of utility is that through side payment
the highest total payoff, denoted ω∗, can be achieved. Here
ω∗ ≡ max
i,j∈{1,2}×{1,2}
(
Aij + Bij
)
. (9)
Define the strategy pair that achieves the maximal payoff by
(i∗, j∗) ≡ arg max
i,j∈{1,2}×{1,2}
(
Aij + Bij
)
. (10)
The payoffs achieved this way are Ai∗,j∗ − σ for A and Bi∗,j∗ + σ for B; clearly
the total utility is ω∗.
For any (i, j) pair, define A˜ij ≡ Aij − σ and B˜ij ≡ Bij + σ. Since, A˜ij +
B˜ij = ωij, where ωij is a constant2, we have that the set of payoff pairs
associated with the strategy pair (i, j) in a TU game fall along a line of
slope -1 that goes through the point (Aij, Bij). As such, the set of possible
payoffs, the feasible region, for a TU game, denoted ΩTU, is defined as the
convex hull off all possible strategy pairs (A˜ij, B˜ij):
ΩTU ≡ Conv
({(A˜ij, B˜ij) : i, j = 1, 2}). (11)
The feasible region associated with a TU game (the set ΩTU) is shown in
Fig. 5(a).
In order to determine what the appropriate side payment is, one needs
to first investigate the strategy applied in the absence of an agreement.
Such a strategy is known as the threat strategy. Define p ≡ [p 1 − p]>
and q ≡ [q 1− q]>, where p is the probability that vehicle A chooses to
change lanes under their threat strategy and q is the probability that vehi-
cle B chooses to not give way under their threat strategy. Under their threat
strategies, the expected payoffs to vehicles A and B are given, respectively,
by TA ≡ p>Aq and TB ≡ p>Bq. The pair (TA, TB) is known as the threat
point.
The expected payoffs TA and TB (associated with the threat strategies)
can be achieved without agreement. Then, in an agreement the payoffs
should be no less than TA for vehicle A and no less than TB for vehicle B.
Since the total payoff from the TU solution is ω∗, we have that the TU so-
lution lies between the two points (TA,ω∗ − TA) and (ω∗ − TB, TB). For
example, if (i∗, j∗) = (1, 2), the range of the TU solution is depicted in
2These constants can vary from one (i, j) pair to another and ωi∗ j∗ = ω∗.
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(a) Feasible set for the TU game (b) Threat point and TU solution
Fig. 5: Feasible set and optimal solution for a TU game.
Fig. 5(b). Thomas (2008) suggests use of the midpoint as a “natural com-
promise”: the two vehicles lose equally if the agreement is broken. The
midpoint solution is also depicted in Fig. 5(b).
The payoffs associated with the midpoint solution are given by the
pair
( TA−TB+ω∗
2 ,
TB−TA+ω∗
2
)
and we immediately see that A’s threat strategy
should be chosen in a way that maximizes TA − TB, while B’s should be
chosen in a way that minimizes it. Since
TA − TB = p>Aq− p>Bq = p>(A− B)q, (12)
we have that selecting the threat strategy can be described as a zero-sum
game, where A’s expected payoff is p>(A− B)q and B’s expected payoff is
p>(B−A)q. From (2), the matrix A− B has the following structure
A− B =
[
0 cAvottAd
−cBvottBd 0
]
. (13)
Since cAvottAd ≥ 0 and cBvottBd ≥ 0, we have that maxi minj(Ai,j − Bi,j) =
minj maxi(Ai,j − Bi,j) = 0 and we always have the saddle point {change
lanes, do no give way}. That is, the solution is a pure strategy, which cor-
responds to vehicle A choosing to change lanes with probability p = 1
and vehicle B choosing to not give way with probability q = 1. While this
strategy results in a crash, a crash will not take place since this is a TU
game: one in which a total utility of ω∗ is guaranteed. We hence have that
p = q = [1 0]> and consequently TA = TB = 0.
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Side payment. The payoffs associated with a TU solution (representing
the natural compromise): 12 (TA − TB + ω∗) for A and 12 (TB − TA + ω∗) for
B. The side payment is immediately given by
σ = Ai∗ j∗ − TA − TB +ω
∗
2
= Ai∗ j∗ − ω
∗
2
(14)
If σ > 0, the side payment is made from vehicle A to vehicle B and A
changes lanes. If σ < 0, the side payment is made from vehicle B to vehicle
A and B does not give way. Note that, since Ai∗ j∗ = ω∗ − Bi∗ j∗ , we have
from (14) that
σ = ω∗ − Bi∗ j∗ − TA − TB +ω
∗
2
= −
(
Bi∗ j∗ − ω
∗
2
)
. (15)
Hence, had we elected to calculate the side payment based on vehicle B’s
payoffs, we obtain the same side payment with a negative sign, signifying
that, in this case, the payment is made in the opposite direction.
2.5. Games with non-transferable utility
When vehicle A encounters a vehicle that does not wish to engage in a
transaction, side payments are not possible. However, when the two vehi-
cles can communicate, bargaining is possible. The motivation for consider-
ing such situations is that we wish to allow for scenarios in which vehicles
do not wish to make side payments and those where it is acknowledged
that payment is not always guaranteed for those that wish to receive side
payments. We note that, from a methodological perspective, this does not
preclude scenarios that do not involve utility transfer.
The feasible set for a non-transaction lane-change game, denoted by
ΩNTU, is the convex hull of the 4 points, (Aij, Bij)i,j∈{1,2}×{1,2}. That is
ΩNTU ≡ Conv
({(Aij, Bij) : i, j = 1, 2}). (16)
The feasible region is illustrated in Fig. 6(a). Communication between ve-
hicle motivates a Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950, 1953) for the NTU
game. The Nash bargaining solution, which we denote by (NA, NB), is the
unique solution to the maximization problem
max
{
(uA −QA)(uB −QB) : (uA, uB) ∈ ΩNTU, uA ≥ QA, uB ≥ QB
}
, (17)
where (QA,QB) is known as the status-quo point. The status quo point oc-
curs before an agreement; QA and QB are the utilities achieved by vehicles
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(a) Feasible set for a NTU game (b) Threat point and Nash bargaining solution
Fig. 6: Feasible set and optimal solution for a non-transaction game.
A and B, respectively, if they do not play the game. It is hence natural to set
(QA,QB) = (0, 0) corresponding to the strategy {A does not change lanes,
B gives way}. Note that in the literature, (QA,QB) is sometimes referred
to as a threat point; we avoid the latter nomenclature to avoid confusion
between (QA,QB) and (TA, TB) in the TU game above.
Returning to the bargaining problem (17), we have that
(NA, NB) = arg max
{
uAuB : (uA, uB) ∈ ΩNTU, uA ≥ 0, uB ≥ 0
}
. (18)
The contour lines of the objective function in (18) are curves that increase
in value the farther one moves away from the origin (0, 0). Since the so-
lution lies in the positive quadrant, the optimal solution lies along the line
connecting the two points (A21, B21) and (A12, B12), depicted in Fig. 6(b) as
a solid black line. The equation of this line is uB = (−B21/A12)uA + B21.
Substituting this into the objective function, we have that
NA =
1
2
A12 and NB =
1
2
B21. (19)
Denote the final decision in NTU game as (i′, j′). We interpret (19) as: the
outcome of the game is either (i′, j′) = (1, 2), meaning {A changes lanes,
B gives way} or (i′, j′) = (2, 1), meaning {A does not change lanes, B does
not give way}, each outcome with probability 0.5.
2.6. Model summary and simulation
The overall process is summarized in Fig. 7. In situations where ve-
14
Fig. 7: Lane change decision process flow chart.
hicles are not completely aware of the utilities of other vehicles, one can
extend the present approach summarized in Fig. 7 to include games such
as those in (Talebpour et al., 2015) (assuming no cooperation). Safety con-
siderations can also be appended to the present framework, where manda-
tory lane change conditions arise: see for example the models presented
in (Treiber and Kesting, 2013, Chapter 14). To simulate and test the lane
changing game, we propose a cellular automaton (Nagel and Schrecken-
berg, 1992; Maerivoet and De Moor, 2005) given in Algorithm 1 below.
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Algorithm 1: Simulation of Traffic Dynamics
Input:
Cell size, number of cells, discrete time step length, inflow rate,
probability of slow-down (psd), {cvot}, percentage of different vehicle
classes, max speed (vmax), total simulation time, initial speeds and
positions of vehicles.
Iterate:
For each time step do:
For each vehicle, starting from downstream most do:
Acceleration: if v < vmax, v← [ v+ 1.
ds ← [ distance to leader in subject lane (# cells)
dt ← [ distance to leader in target lane (# cells)
If strategy chosen is stay then
vstay ← [ min(v, ⌈ ds−12 ⌉).
End If
If strategy chosen is change lanes then
vchange ← [ min(v, vstay + 1, ⌈ dt−12 ⌉).
End If
Randomization: With probability psd, vstay ← [ max(0, vstay − 1) and
vchange ← [ max(0, vchange − 1).
End For
For each lead/lag vehicle pair (A and B) from downstream most do:
Calculate A, B.
If A and B are TVs then
Play TU game: Find (i∗, j∗) and σ.
Else
Play NTU game: Find (i′, j′).
End If
Update vAstay, v
A
change, v
B
stay, and v
B
change.
End For
For each vehicle do:
Update system state:
If vchange > vstay then
change lane state
End If
v← [ max(vchange, vstay).
End For
End For
Algorithm 1 considers a two-lane road represented as a two-dimensional
uniform latticeL×I , whereL is the longitudinal dimension and I is cross-
sectional dimension (i.e., the lanes). The spatial discretization is such that
each site in the lattice can be occupied by at most one vehicle. The state of
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each (occupied) site during a discrete time step is specified by discretized
speeds, which can take integer values between 0 and vmax, where vmax is
the maximum number of cells that can be traversed by a vehicle on the road
during a single discrete time step. The simulation procedure is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
3. Experiments
3.1. Numerical example
Consider two vehicle classes on the road, one with high VOT and one
with low VOT. The equilibrium mean speeds are 38 km/h for TVs with
high VOT and 31 km/h for TVs with low VOT. We assume that vehicle A
has low VOT and wants to make a lane change; it has two options: change
lane and achieve a speed of vA1 = 55 km/h, or stay and maintain a speed of
vA2 = 25 km/h. vehicle B, with high VOT, is the competing lag vehicle and
it has two options: do not give way and achieve a speed of vB1 = 52 km/h
and give way to achieve a speed of vB2 = 45 km/h. Following (Hossan et al.,
2016), the VOT coefficient for a low VOT vehicle is set to cAvot =10 dollars/h
and that for the high VOT vehicle class is set to cBvot =25 dollars/h. We
assumed that they are honest in their VOT. We set ta = 3 s, aA1 = −4 m/s2,
aA2 = 1 m/s
2, aB1 = −3 m/s2, and aB2 = −1 m/s2. Applying (8), we have
that tAd = 2.26 s and t
B
d = 0.34 s. Then based on Table 2 and Equation (2),
we have the payoff matrix given in Table 3.
Table 3: Utility matrix for example TU game
Actions
vehicle B
Do not give way Give way
vehicle A
Change lane (−M, −M) (0.0062, 0)
Do not change lane (0, 0.0023) (0, 0)
Following the steps in Sec. 2.4, we get ω∗ = 0.0062, TA − TB = 0, and
the TU solution for this game is (0.0031, 0.0031). The cooperative strategy
(i∗, j∗) is {A changes lanes, B gives way}, and Ai∗ j∗ = A12 = 0.0062. Since
σ = Ai∗ j∗ − TA−TB+ω∗2 = 0.0062− 0.0031 = 0.0031 is positive, A would pay
B 0.0031 dollars to change lanes and B receives 0.0031 dollars to give way
to A. It is worth noting that, in this case, even though A has a lower VOT
than B, it is still possible that A is willing to pay B to change lanes. But, in
general, vehicles with higher VOT are more likely to be the payers.
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3.2. Simulation experiments: Analysis of benefit to TVs
The defaults parameters used for the experiments in the remainder of
this section are set to: cell size = 7.5 m, total length of road = 20.25km, time
step = 1 s, vmax = 5 cells/s, apos = 1 cell/s2, aneg = -1 cell/s2, number of
lanes = 2, psd = 1/3, High-VOT = 25 dollars/h, low-VOT = 10 dollars/h
(Hossan et al., 2016), penetration rate of TV = 1, and high-to-low VOT ratio
= 1:4. Figures 8 - 11 depict the results of simulation experiments, where
we change the penetration rates of TVs and traffic densities. Income and
time savings per hour are illustrated in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 under varying traf-
fic densities for both high VOT TVs and low VOT TVs. They show that
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income is, in general, negative for high VOT TVs while the time saved is
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positive. For the low VOT TVs, we see the exact opposite. This is intu-
itive. To appreciate the trade-off between travel time saving and income,
consider the following “benefit” index:
β =
1
Ttr
∑
i∈V
∑
g∈Gi
(
civot∆T
tr
i,g + Ii,g
)
, (20)
where β denotes benefit, Ttr is the average travel time of all vehicles i in
the set of TV vehicles V , ∆Ttri,g is the travel time saved (can be negative)
by vehicle i in the lane change game g, Gi is the set of lane change games
played by vehicle i and Ii,g is the net income earned by vehicle i in game g
(can be negative). The total benefit per hour-travel is illustrated in Fig. 10
under varying densities for high and low VOT TVs.
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Fig. 10: The total benefit per hour-travel for (a) high VOT TVs and (b) low VOT TVs.
For both high and low VOT TVs, the benefit is positive in general.
Furthermore, as TV penetration rates increase, the total benefit tends to
grow. We see the same pattern as the traffic density increases from 0 to 120
veh/km. For densities approaching the jam density (133 veh/km in our
simulations), lane changing becomes more difficult and benefit approaches
zero. Hence, the highest benefit to both high and low VOT TVs is around
heavy congestion, but where vehicles can still perform lane change maneu-
vers. Similarly, the simulation results (Fig. 10) show that in free flow condi-
tions (density <10 veh/km), in total jam condition (density >131 veh/km)
or when TV penetration rate is very low (<0.05), the benefit is very small
(between -0.2% and 0.2%). Because the benefit of TVs is always positive,
some NTVs may be encouraged to join TU games. Moreover, higher pen-
etration rates mean higher benefit. Hence joining TU games can result in
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increased benefit to all vehicles.
Truthfulness in reporting VOT. Truthfulness is a topic that has re-
ceived little attention in traffic flow research (Yang et al., 2018). To inves-
tigate the impact of untruthful reporting of VOT, we relax the truthful re-
porting assumption and consider two scenarios: one in which high-VOT
vehicles declare they are low-VOT vehicles and one where low-VOT vehi-
cles declare they are high-VOT vehicles. As with the previous experiments,
we test these two scenarios under varying traffic densities and varying TV
penetration rates. For high VOT vehicles, the experiments attempt to gauge
whether the monetary gains (whether this is in the form paying less to
change lanes or being paid when denied a lane change opportunity) ex-
ceed (on average) the gains in travel time weighted by VOT. Similarly, in
the case of the low VOT vehicle reporting a higher VOT, the experiments
are mean to gauge whether the improvement in travel time weighted by
true VOT that can be gained by being untruthful can exceed (on average)
the amounts they are paid by other vehicle the vehicles. In both cases, our
experiments indicate that the answer in no: being untruthful reduces total
benefit, β.
Fig. 11 illustrates the total benefits per hour travel for these two scenar-
ios; Fig. 11(a) is a plot of the total benefit of high VOT TVs when they are
untruthful (they declare that they are low VOT TVs) and Fig. 11(b) is a plot
of the total benefit of low VOT TVs when they are untruthful (they declare
that they are high VOT TVs). In both cases, we observe negative benefits
in high traffic density scenarios, which suggests that there is no incentive
to lie about their VOT. This hints that the mechanism that we proposed in-
centivizes truthfulness. We leave this at the conjecture level and attack the
problem of mechanism design and truthfulness to future research.
“VIP” TVs. In this experiment, we vary the cvot for the high VOT TV
while holding all else fixed. Specifically, cvot for the low VOT TV is 10
dollars/h and the penetration rate of high VOT TVs is held at 1% (very
small percentage). This is an example of high profile vehicle (along with
their entourage). The results are illustrated in Fig. 12. In moderate to very
high congestion, the “VIP” TVs save about 10-35% in travel time when cvot
is increased from 10 dollars/h to 60 dollars/h. Interestingly, however, we
observe a bound on time saving of about 38%, which when reached cannot
be improved with greater payment (greater cvot doesn’t make sence when
it is larger than 40 dollars/h). This can be attributed to the simple nature
of the TU game that is being tested in this paper. To be specific, the 38%
bound can be attributed to the “VIP” TV being blocked by their leaders
(in the subject lane). The 38% bound may be broken if the TV is allowed
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to engage in transactions with multiple vehicles simultaneously, namely,
including the lag vehicle in the target lane and leaders in both the subject
and target lanes.
3.3. Simulation experiments: Impact on traffic
Speed-density relation. We examine the impact of introducing trans-
actions on traffic as whole. The first experiments compare the resulting
speed-density relations when TVs constitute 100% of the vehicle popula-
tion and when they constitute only 50% of the vehicle population. Fig. 13(a)
compares the speed-density relations of NTVs in the 50% case with all ve-
hicles (both TV and NTV) in both the 100% and 50% cases. The figure
shows a very small (almost unnoticeable) decrease in mean (equilibrium)
speeds of NTVs across a range of traffic densities when the percentage of
TVs is 50%. We can, at the very least, say that the introduction of TVs does
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not adversely impact mean speeds (in fact, we see slight improvement).
In Fig. 13(b), we see a more noticeable difference in mean speeds across a
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range of traffic densities between high and low VOT TVs. Specifically, we
see that the speeds of high-VOT TVs are higher than the speeds of low-VOT
TVs, outside of free flow conditions and totally jammed traffic, by as much
as 60%. In the former case, lane changes are either not needed to improve
speeds or can be carried out without the need to negotiate gaps; in the latter
case, changing lanes will not help improve speeds.
We next investigate the impact of TV penetration on the speed-density
relations pertaining to high and low VOT TVs. Fig. 14 shows that as the TV
penetration rate increases, the speeds of high VOT TVs will increase, the
speeds of low VOT TVs tend to drop, but very slightly. (Note that the scale
of the x-axis in Fig. 14(a) and Fig. 14(b) do not include the entire range
of traffic densities that were tested; this was done to illustrate the differ-
ences/similarities for the different penetration rates.) As the TV penetra-
tion rates approach zero, the speed-density relations of the high and the
low VOT TVs converge. The higher TV penetration rate means a higher
probability of TU games taking place, and this gives the high VOT TVs
more opportunities to increase their speeds, while low VOT TVs can also
“sell” their time more frequently.
We next investigate the impact of varying low-to-high VOT TV ratios.
The results are given in Fig. 15. Clearly, high VOT TVs always have higher
speeds than low VOT TVs. An interesting finding is that, as the ratio of
high VOT TVs increases, the speeds of both low and high VOT vehicles
decrease. On one hand, a higher high VOT TV fraction results in lower
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Fig. 14: Density and speed relationship varying TVs’ penetration rate: (a) high VOT TVs (b)
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frequencies of transactions with low VOT TVs, leading to a decrease in high
VOT TV speeds. On the other hand, higher high VOT TV fractions results
in low VOT TV giving way to high VOT TVs with frequency, leading to a
decrease in low VOT TV speeds. Hence a healthy market share should have
a relatively higher percentage of low VOT vehicles than high VOT vehicles.
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Shock wave formation. Finally, a 4.5km ring road is simulated over a
1-hour time period and we compare the traffic dynamics that arise in two
scenarios: (i) 100% TVs (i.e., 0% NTVs) and (ii) 0% TV (i.e., 100% NTVs).
Two cases are investigated in each scenario: a case of below (but near)
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critical traffic density with 13.3 veh/km·lane and a case of super-critical
(jammed) traffic with 33.3 veh/km·lane. Fig. 16 shows the resulting speed
heat maps (average of both lanes) for all four cases. Fig. 16(a) and Fig. 16(c)
are the heatmaps obtained in the sub-critical cases (average density = 13.3
veh/km·lane). We see the formation of both forward and backward waves
clearly in both cases, but they appear to be less severe in the first sce-
nario (100% TVs). Fig. 16(b) and Fig. 16(d) are the heatmaps obtained in
the super-critical cases (average density = 33.3 veh/km·lane). In general,
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there is no significant difference in the wave formation characteristics in
high density traffic conditions. Therefore, while it is difficult to conclude
that TU games can prevent stop and go waves from forming, we can com-
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fortably conclude that TU games do not have an adverse effect on traffic
conditions in general.
4. Conclusion and outlook
Vehicles available on the market today come equipped with advanced
sensor technologies and in many vehicles features such as adaptive cruise
control and lane departure warning come standard. This allows vehicles
(on the roads today) to respond to traffic conditions around them. It is safe
to bet that communication between vehicles is right around the corner. This
creates opportunities for re-thinking traffic management in radical ways.
This thinking is the premise of this paper. We proposed a treatment of
lane changing as transferable utility (TU) games with side payments. We
demonstrated that the proposed utility transfer allows vehicles engaged
in such transactions to achieve pareto efficient payoffs. The main idea is
that vehicles exchange right-of-way for money. This constitutes a departure
from cooperative lane changing involving winners and losers to one where
all players can win.
A cellular automaton was developed to perform experiments. The sim-
ulation results indicate that the ability to play TU games had no impact on
travel times in free-flow conditions, heavy (bumper-to-bumper) traffic con-
ditions, or when the penetration of vehicles willing to engage in TU games
approaches zero. Otherwise, both vehicles with low and high values of
travel time (VOT) derived benefit from the proposed approach.
The proposed model is rather simple. Our aim was to test the idea of
TU games for lane changing at an approachable level. This creates nu-
merous avenues for future research. From considering more sophisticated
models of utility and traffic dynamics, to utility transfer for mandatory lane
change maneuvers, to games that involve more than two players with more
choices, to games that include unconnected vehicles. Along the lines of the
utility function, the estimated values of the constants can have a significant
impact on the time difference parameter, which can have a substantial im-
pact on the outcomes of the games. One topic for future research involves
the design of lane changing games that are robust to estimation errors. On
the other hand, in the absence of estimation errors, we conjecture that the
TU framework proposed in this paper disincentivizes untruthfulness when
reporting value of time. An approach grounded in mechanism design will
help shed light on this analytically. We have not seen this problem attacked
in the lane-changing literature, but similar ideas have appeared recently
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in relation to bottleneck trading (Wang et al., 2018) and platooning of con-
nected vehicles (Sun and Yin, 2019). That the outcome of the games de-
pends on communicated VOTs creates opportunities to game the system and
it might be possible to engage in multiple transactions and exploit arbitrage
opportunities. Hence, appropriate pricing schemes would be a particularly
interesting avenue to investigate.
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